Mahmood Jalali; Masumeh Shakoori
Volume 1, Issue 3 , March 2013, , Pages 151-177
Abstract
To protect contracts, eliminate International trade barriers and regulatenew forms of trade relations, states have long strived to minimize differencesin their legal systems as to provide more desirable legal protection forinternational economic activities. Despite the fact that these unified codesare ...
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To protect contracts, eliminate International trade barriers and regulatenew forms of trade relations, states have long strived to minimize differencesin their legal systems as to provide more desirable legal protection forinternational economic activities. Despite the fact that these unified codesare transnational and are thus considered non-binding in nature, contractingparties may agree to give them a binding force if so desired. Transnationalcodes mainly come in to force after national constitutional ratificationrequirements including those of Iran are satisfied otherwise theirenforceability may only be assumed to the extent where they have nocontradiction with internal laws (subject to Articles 10,975 and 986 of theIran’s Civil Code). Optional set of rules may bear different legal results andprovide a range of options for states to choose from. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations are both active players in formulation of unifiedcodes in form of international conventions or alternatively model principlesand legal guides which have helped expediting their ratification process. Informulating the same, with inspiration from International trade customs,either they have merged rules from various legal regimes or have takeninitiatives to work out totally new model codes. This article will review jointinterests of states in minimizing obstacles in ratification and execution ofsuch set of rule
